WILLIAMSON (FINAL)

12/1/2008 11:38:34 AM

Keynote Address
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Thank you. It is a privilege to be here at Seton Hall this morning and to have this opportunity to speak with you. As Randy indicated, I am the Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, and for
those of you who are unfamiliar with this position, I will give you a
brief overview of my responsibilities. I report directly to the Secretary
of State and advise her on issues relating to potential violations of international humanitarian law. My position is unique in the world in
that the United States is the only government that maintains a position at the ambassadorial level focusing exclusively on war crimes issues. My office has responsibility within the State Department for
monitoring atrocities globally, as well as for monitoring transitional
justice mechanisms, such as international, hybrid, and domestic war
crimes courts.
In relation to ongoing crises, or to accountability processes, we
have lead responsibility for formulating U.S. government policies,
which we obviously do in conjunction with other components at the
State Department and with the U.S. government as a whole. And, as
my title suggests, I have a diplomatic role, engaging other governments on our policies and generally advocating for greater accountability for war crimes.
As Randy mentioned, my educational and work background is
primarily in the justice sector, having served as a State Prosecutor in
New Orleans, a Federal Prosecutor in Washington, and then for
seven years at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY). I have also spent years working in the area of
post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction, with a focus on rule of
law and security issues. I served in field assignments in Iraq, in Kosovo and in other places throughout the Balkans, and then at the National Security Council (NSC). My portfolio encompassed these issues, first as Director for Stability Operations, and then in my last job,
as Special Assistant to the President, and Senior Director for Relief,
Stabilization, and Development. And it is from this combined justice
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sector, reconstruction, stabilization perspective that I want to speak to
you today, highlighting the integral role of rule of law in post-conflict
reconstruction and stabilization efforts.
As we have seen time and time again, the establishment of rule
of law and a secure environment is critical to the success of any postconflict intervention effort. Without a secure environment, everything else fails; it is impossible to educate children, to foster an economy, to deliver health care, to reliably provide essential services like
water and electricity, and most significantly, perhaps, to establish stable political institutions.
Everyone is familiar with the challenges that the United States
has faced in Iraq, where creation of a secure environment has been
elusive. While the scale of the problems in Iraq is daunting, the challenges faced there are not unique. We have seen similar challenges
on almost every continent and in every post-conflict or peacekeeping
mission in the last fifteen years. The lesson is the same: if we do not
get rule of law and security right, nothing else will work.
To focus on this, I will talk a little bit today about my personal
experiences working in the field, highlighting how the failure to plan
or to act has hampered stabilization efforts. I want to then lay out for
you some of the thinking on how the U.S. government, and in fact
the broader international community, might approach these issues in
the future.
As I mentioned a moment ago, after working as a prosecutor in
the United States, I was posted by the Department of Justice to the
ICTY. As a trial attorney there, I supervised investigations, drafted
indictments, and then tried cases in court. I also was tasked with a
fair amount of pseudo-diplomatic responsibilities, acting as an interlocutor on behalf of the ICTY with political figures, military leaders,
and security services in the Balkans.
In carrying out these duties and in supervising investigations, I
spent approximately half of my time at the ICTY on the ground in the
region. Starting in 1994, while the war was still in full swing in Bosnia, through the Kosovo conflict in 1999, and on to 2001, I had the
opportunity to be there both in the periods of ongoing conflict and
as the various post-conflict missions were established. During the last
year of the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, in 1995, there was
little support for the ICTY’s work, and absolutely no willingness by
U.N. forces to arrest indicted war criminals, who admittedly were few
in number at that time.
When the NATO Mission was deployed to Bosnia, at the beginning of 1996 in the aftermath of the Dayton Accords, we at the ICTY
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hoped that there would be a more robust approach by peacekeepers
toward war criminals, who were moving around freely throughout the
country. For the first year and a half when NATO was on the ground,
though, they refused to undertake any arrests. The most oft-cited
reason for not acting was that it was not in NATO’s mandate to effect
arrests. Fundamentally, though, it boiled down to concerns about
force protection—that arrests would generate retaliatory attacks
against NATO troops. The result was that many of those who had
triggered the war in the first place, and who had been responsible for
the worst atrocities, continued to be active, if not fully in the open,
then barely under the surface. This was obviously counter-productive
to the international efforts to stabilize Bosnia, and it sent a clear message that rule of law was a secondary concern.
Another peacekeeping mission was established in Eastern Croatia simultaneously to the one set up in Bosnia, and this one was
headed by an American diplomat named Jacques Klein, who made
clear to the ICTY that he would order forces under his command to
arrest any indicted war criminals found in the area he controlled. I
had coordinated investigations in this region of Croatia, so I worked
closely with Klein to execute the arrest of one of the individuals I had
indicted. He had, by that time, moved to Serbia, so we hatched an
elaborate plan to lure him back across the border, at which time he
was arrested by Polish troops. We bundled him onto a Belgian Air
Force plane and flew him to The Hague. It soon became clear that
the much-feared reaction from the population was not going to materialize. There were a few incendiary news articles, and the Milosevic
government declared me and two investigators persona non grata for
our role in the kidnapping, but that was basically it.
Three weeks later, British NATO troops in Bosnia undertook the
first arrest there. In one operation the suspect was killed in a shootout. Yet even that failed to ignite retaliatory actions against NATO
forces, or even any significant unrest. Soon other arrests followed,
and it quickly became a standard practice for NATO to detain indicted subjects. The result was that many of these spoilers—those
disruptive to the stabilization efforts—either ended up in prison or
had to go underground to evade capture. This made a very positive
impact on the overall political dynamic in Bosnia, but it came a year
and a half later than it should have because key actors in the stabilization and reconstruction efforts thought we could get by without confronting these issues head on.
NATO and the U.N. worked diligently to apply lessons learned
in Bosnia to their planning for the Kosovo Missions, which were es-
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tablished in the aftermath of the bombing campaign in June 1999. I
was involved in certain aspects of this planning as the ICTY representative. NATO and the U.N. were fully committed from the outset to
arresting war criminals in Kosovo, although we thought it very
unlikely that any of the senior Serbian officials indicted by the ICTY
would be found there.
We at the ICTY were much more concerned about the preservation of evidence and securing mass graves, objectives that NATO
shared and committed to try to achieve. I spent much of the war in
Albania, running the ICTY Operations in Tirana, and then went in
with NATO troops on June 12, 1999. Within days, despite all of our
advanced planning, we were completely overwhelmed as reports of
mass graves and other evidentiary sites proliferated.
As to the mass graves, we had lined up forensic teams from a
number of countries to do exhumations, but it would take weeks to
get them on the ground. In the meantime, we needed NATO troops
to secure the sites. There simply were not enough troops to do this,
nor to keep the troves of documents from being pilfered.
The inability, despite the best of intentions, to support the
ICTY’s work was only the tip of the iceberg. U.N. advance elements
that entered Kosovo with NATO had no operational law enforcement
personnel, so NATO troops were doing all policing. There were no
functioning courts. So again, NATO took on responsibility for this to
the extent they could, having military lawyers review the circumstances of detentions made by troops in the field. Most of those detained were caught red-handed looting or committing acts of violence. But very soon NATO soldiers were getting approached by
people throughout Kosovo who wanted to identify individuals in their
communities who had committed war crimes during the course of
the bombing campaign—a very different, and more complex, policing challenge.
I got pulled into this exercise by NATO, asked to review all of
these complaints. Pretty soon, we were getting hundreds of such
complaints. I started every day in Kosovo at the NATO Force Commander’s staff meeting, which was also attended by the incoming
U.N. Police Commissioner, who was at that point a police force of
one. The NATO Commander harangued him every day about when
U.N. civilian police would start arriving. In the end, it took several
months for any appreciable U.N. police presence to get deployed,
throughout which time NATO troops continued to perform virtually
all law enforcement functions, diverting them from virtually every
other responsibility they had.
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For the remainder of 1999, the international community remained focused on getting police on the ground, paying little attention to the other components of the justice system: the courts and the
prisons. It is a mistake that has been repeated time and time again in
post-conflict settings with disastrous results. For if a justice system is
to be effective, the three principle components of that system—
police, courts, and prisons—must be developed simultaneously and at
the same rate. If the police are arresting fifty people on a given day,
you must have a prison system that is capable of processing fifty new
prisoners and a court system that is capable of handling fifty new
cases. An analogy that I have often used is that it is like a threelegged stool. If any one of the legs is shorter than the others, the
stool will collapse.
In Kosovo, as in many other settings, everyone focused on getting civilian police on the streets in order to relieve the military of law
enforcement responsibilities. But without a truly functioning court
system, and with only rudimentary prison facilities, any good work the
police did was lost when it came time to move to the next stage of the
criminal justice process. Although the U.N. Mission in Kosovo
(UNMIK) was set up in 1999, these problems were still not rectified
in late 2001, when having left the ICTY, I returned to Pristina as the
Director of the UNMIK Department of Justice, the functional Minister of Justice for the U.N.-administered province.
What I found when I took this position was that the Department
of Justice was really a hodge-podge of different offices, including the
courts, the prosecutors’ offices, missing persons, forensic operations,
and the prison system. They had all been set up in an ad hoc fashion
over the preceding two years, as needed to deal with issues as they
arose. There was no strategic thinking behind the creation of the
various components. There was no coherent structure which defined
it as a unified entity, and there was no top-down coordination of its
diverse functions. My highest priority then became transforming this
mess into a coherent, functioning ministry of justice that could eventually be turned over to local Kosovar control.
My efforts in this regard were the first attempts to do something
like this in the two years that UNMIK had been running Kosovo.
Throughout that time, the police were a well organized entity, with a
clear chain of command and clear operational protocols. Although
one could argue how effective UNMIK police were, at least there was
a recognizable structure there, and the police functioned in a manner roughly consistent with other forces throughout the world. The
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same could not be said for the other justice components, which were
still barely recognizable as such.
The fact that it took two years to address this fundamental shortcoming shows the extent to which people simply did not understand
the concept of rule of law. Getting bad actors off the street is a priority, but it is not an end in and of itself. To his credit, Ambassador
Menzies, when he became U.S. Chief of Mission in Kosovo, saw fixing
this as a high priority, and he played a pivotal role in pushing for the
changes that were needed. Other NATO governments got squarely
behind this initiative as well, because they too came to recognize that
unless something was done about the instability in Kosovo, their
troops would be stuck there for a very long time. The only viable solution to this problem was a robust, comprehensive justice system.
During my tenure in Kosovo, we initiated the first war crimes
and organized crime prosecutions to be brought in local courts. Using international judges and prosecutors working alongside Kosovar
jurors, we were able to make some progress, at least signaling that
there would be no impunity and we would go after even the most senior figures. I do not want to overstate the achievement here. We certainly did not eradicate organized crime in Kosovo, but we made a
start.
The bottom line is that, in order to stabilize a country or region
in the aftermath of conflict and to establish effective rule of law, it
takes a sustained effort. There is a constant turnover of people in
missions like this. Some of my successors as Director of Justice pursued the same path aggressively and launched prosecutions. Some of
the Police Commissioners were very interested in this; others were
not. So it was a mixed bag. But when a country’s institutions have
been totally destroyed, when criminals have been given free reign,
when the concepts of what is right and what is wrong have been
turned upside down, it cannot be repaired overnight. It highlights
one of the most difficult challenges of any international intervention
in a crisis zone. The nature of these missions is such that very few
people are there for the duration of time it takes to mount a sustained effort to stabilize. Like me, many come for one year; some for
even less. By the time I took the job in Kosovo, I had already spent
seven years in the Balkans. I had been working in post-conflict environments throughout that whole time period, so I knew how to operate in this environment. I had a very small learning curve.
Most who went there had to learn about a place they had never
been, and whose culture was completely alien to them, not to mention the difficulty of transferring their experience and skills from
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domestic jobs into the supercharged post-conflict crisis environment
in which they found themselves now working. By the time they would
finally learn about the place and how to do their jobs there, it was
almost always time for them to rotate out. With this ongoing dynamic, it is extremely difficult to mount and sustain a stabilization effort, but it is what we encounter every time we enter into one of these
scenarios.
The problem has been compounded by the fact that over and
over post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction operations have
been organized in an ad hoc fashion. I once heard Senator Biden
describe it like this: every time we go into a post-conflict or peacekeeping situation, we do it like it is the first time it has ever happened, and when we shut it down, we act as if it is never going to
happen again. This has been true, not only of the United States, but
to an extent of the international community at large. Even the
United Nations, with its sizeable Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), has very few standing resources that can be applied to
any given crisis. They have to be assembled as each situation presents
itself, particularly in the security and rule of law sectors.
I left Kosovo at the end of 2002 with these lessons fresh in my
mind, coming back to Washington and posting at the White House
on the National Security Council staff. When I first started at the
NSC and was going through my entry interviews with Dr. Rice, who
was then the National Security Advisor, and her Deputy, Steve Hadley, they picked up on my post-conflict work and asked me to look at
how we, the U.S. government, could do a better job of preparing for
and fielding civilian responses to post-conflict or crisis situations.
My general approach was to suggest sort of a U.S. government
equivalent of U.N. DPKO that could enhance U.S. participation in
U.N. peacekeeping missions, NATO missions, or interventions by the
United States and other interested states. Because of my direct experience, I felt strongly that the most robust component of a standing
civilian response mechanism should be in the rule of law area. The
proposal that I worked on, combined with the work of many others,
eventually led to the creation of the Office of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization, known by its acronym, S/CRS.
My good friend John Herbst is here, who is the Coordinator, and
I am sure you will be hearing much more about this later today.
While S/CRS has experienced a rather bumpy start, particularly in
terms of funding and the growing pains of any new office fighting for
bureaucratic turf, it is moving forward with plans for development of
a civilian reserve. Composed of on-call experts in many fields who
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can be readily deployed to a crisis zone, this would provide the U.S.
with a standing response capability that thus far we have only had on
the military side. Simply getting people into crisis zones who have
had experience working in these types of environments will be a huge
help. Significantly, the initial tranche of the reserve would be in the
rule of law and security sectors.
U.S. efforts to create this sort of capability have not gone on in
isolation. A number of other governments, including the United
Kingdom, Germany, and Canada, have launched similar initiatives
over the last few years and have, in some instances, advanced beyond
the United States in implementation of their plans. Likewise, the
United Nations has undertaken reforms to improve civilian peacekeeping capabilities and to build in a more dependable rule of law
and policing component. The European Union is also engaged in
similar efforts.
My experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo and later in Iraq were not
unique. The frustrations I encountered in rule of law field operations were shared by many others from other governments and from
the United Nations in a myriad of post-conflict settings. Like me,
they came out of these situations with a determination that the whole
approach could be improved significantly. They have gone back to
their respective countries and international organizations pressing
for change.
So, the more governments that do this, the better. It is also vitally important that these types of undertakings not be limited just to
North America and Europe. Having strong regional actors in Latin
America, Asia, and particularly Africa, will strengthen any framework
that is created, and the more robust a framework there is for response, and the more diverse it is, the more it will benefit all of us.
My comments thus far have focused on the difficulties associated
with establishing rule of law in post-conflict environments, with anecdotes about what can go wrong when it is not established. In a very
general sense, I have laid out the prescription that the international
community seems to have adopted: better pre-planning, more robust
standing capabilities, and development of a pool of experts who can
apply their experience to contingencies as they arise around the
world. These changes will not fix all of the problems; the challenges
are too complex and vary too much from situation to situation. But
these measures will help all of us do a better job responding and increasing the odds of long-term success.
A key indicator of success will be how we deal with transitional
justice issues, the generic term used most often to describe mecha-
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nisms for addressing war crimes and other large-scale atrocities. This
is the specific area in which I now focus as Ambassador for War
Crimes Issues. In the time left to me, I would like to turn to this specialized area within the broader rule of law world and discuss the
United States’s perspective on this issue.
In general, I think it is fair to say that it is necessary to focus resources on transitional justice for years following a conflict. What I
am talking about here is confronting those crimes that were at the
core of a given conflict—the ethnically driven murders, the largescale massacres, the political assassinations. The legacy of these
crimes hangs over countries long after the fighting has stopped.
To cite a specific example in Bosnia, following the International
Court of Justice verdict in the Bosnia-Serbia genocide case, nationalist rhetoric briefly returned to a height not seen in several years. The
situation has remained tense since then, and we now see Bosnia perhaps at its most fragile point since the Dayton Accords were signed in
1995. The verdict, once again, brought to the fore old grievances
that had never been addressed adequately.
Recognizing that a prior violent conflict is one of the strongest
indicators of risk for future conflict, dealing with these grievances is
not only a factor for short-term stabilization, it is also a key preventative measure for renewed hostilities. One key element of this approach is the establishment of judicial or non-judicial mechanisms
for dealing with those who may have committed atrocities. I believe
that this is an essential tool because it contributes to the overall stability of a post-conflict society. It decreases the likelihood that small incidents will escalate into broader patterns of violence, and it creates a
deterrent effect. If done successfully, it imbues in the local community a sense of confidence that the judiciary—i.e., non-violent
means—can set things straight, and can mete out justice without resort to retaliation or settling of scores.
Firmly setting the precedent that people are held to account for
atrocities they have committed is a valuable tool to have when invariably something goes wrong. Going back to my example of Bosnia,
if an individual or small group commits an inter-ethnic hate crime,
there is a smaller chance of escalation into a larger conflict if the affected population feels that it can turn to some judicial system, be it
local or international, and successfully seek redress.
To a lesser extent, but certainly not an insignificant one, successfully prosecuting war criminals deters potential perpetrators. While it
is difficult for practical reasons to cite specific cases of individuals
who are deterred from committing crimes, it is relatively simple to
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point out instances in which a strong record of accountability might
have had a partial deterrent effect. And as I mentioned earlier, it also
removes certain individuals from active participation in the political
process, thus diminishing their ability to act as spoilers in the overall
stabilization and reconstruction effort.
In an aftermath of a conflict or crisis in which crimes were
committed on a massive scale, the United States’s first preference will
always be for the domestic justice system to handle cases that arise. If
the system is robust enough, it may only require financial assistance,
technical support, or international advisors. But if this sort of assistance would enable the domestic system to work effectively, it is to
everyone’s benefit to let justice be addressed through existing structures.
We recognize, however, that in many situations the domestic system will be so weak, or so affected by recent events, that it cannot
dispense justice fairly. In those circumstances our next preference
would be to create some sort of hybrid system, mixing domestic and
international capabilities. This could manifest itself along the lines of
the Kosovo model I discussed a few minutes ago, one in which international judges and prosecutors are inserted into existing domestic
courts, serving alongside local jurists.
Another model with the hybrid approach is to create a standalone court, made up of mixed international and local actors, perhaps even with a different substantive and procedural law governing
it. This is the approach that was taken with the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Khmer Rouge Tribunal in Cambodia, and now with
the Hariri Lebanon tribunal.
The final option, if a domestic or hybrid court is not feasible, is a
purely international court. This could come in the form of the ICTY
or the ICTR, the Rwanda tribunal—ad hoc international tribunals
created by the Security Council. Frankly though, I think it is very
unlikely that with the establishment of the International Criminal
Court, the ICC, that we will see other purely international courts established. So that really leaves the ICC as the international court of
last resort.
As I am sure most people know, the United States has had some
reservations about the ICC, and has chosen not to join the Court. We
do, nevertheless, recognize that the ICC has a prominent role in the
sphere of international justice, and in certain situations it will be the
most appropriate venue for handling particular war crimes cases.
Darfur is such a situation, and that is why the United States con-
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curred in the decision to refer that matter to the ICC for investigation and prosecution.
Interestingly, the U.S. approach I have just outlined is very much
consistent with the ICC’s own approach, in which domestic courts are
seen as the preferable first option, then hybrid courts, which are
theoretically less expensive and more efficient than purely international ones. In the ICC’s own eyes, they see themselves as the court
of last resort. And as I said a moment ago, when other options are
not viable, then we too will support cases going to the ICC.
As to the U.S. role in this process, we will continue to actively
support domestic, hybrid, and international courts with financial and
technical assistance, with substantive expertise, with information sharing, and with diplomatic engagement. We are by far the single biggest donor for war crimes courts around the world, having contributed to the ICTY and ICTR alone over $500,000,000. Where the ICC
is concerned, we will support referrals of cases and information sharing, where appropriate, but we are constrained by law from providing
financial or substantive support to the court. Whether this will
change at some point in the future, I cannot say, but in any event,
such a change is not imminent.
The concept of international justice and accountability for war
crimes was virtually non-existent as recently as fourteen years ago.
Since then, we have witnessed the establishment of the ICTY and
ICTR, the creation of hybrid war crimes courts, and finally, the birth
of a permanent international court, the ICC. We have seen Slobodan
Milosevic, Saddam Hussein, and now Charles Taylor brought to trial.
While it is still not completely the norm that heads of state be held
accountable, it is no longer an inconceivable notion, and in fact trial
now seems like a more likely outcome for such people than does an
exalted exile in some third country. I think this reflects the fact that
there is now a widespread recognition that impunity is a destabilizing
influence, either in the context of heinous war crimes or common
street crimes. Both have to be confronted if we hope to succeed in
future attempts to stabilize and reconstruct war torn countries. The
responses that we apply to these challenges are varied, and they have
to be because of the wide variety of situations we face.
Every conflict, every crisis, every country is unique, and thus
there is never going to be a one-size-fits-all solution. Yet we can learn
from our experiences over the last fifteen years and do a much better
job of preparing for and fashioning our responses to the next crisis
that presents itself. Because if anything is certain, there will be a next
time. Thank you.

